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Abstract
Despite the popularity and practical applicability
of blockchains, there is very limited work on the
theoretical foundation of blockchains: The lack of
rigorous theory and analysis behind the curtain of
blockchains has severely staggered its broader ap-
plications. This paper attempts to lay out a theoret-
ical foundation for a specific type of blockchains—
the ones requiring basic authenticity from the par-
ticipants, also called permissioned blockchain. We
formulate permissioned blockchain systems and
operations into a game-theoretical problem by in-
corporating constraints implied by the wisdom
from distributed computing and Byzantine systems.
We show that in a noncooperative blockchain game
(NBG), a Nash equilibrium can be efficiently found
in a closed-form even though the game involves
more than two players. Somewhat surprisingly, the
simulation results of the Nash equilibrium implies
that the game can reach a stable status regardless
of the number of Byzantine nodes and trustworthy
players. We then study a harder problem where
players are allowed to form coalitions: the coali-
tional blockchain game (CBG). We show that al-
though the Shapley value for a CBG can be ex-
pressed in a more succinct form, its core is empty.
1 Introduction
Although initially introduced in the form of a cryptocur-
rency Bitcoin more than a decade ago, it was not until a few
years ago when the internal mechanism named blockchain
started to draw attention. While the research and practice
on cryptocurrency-driven research on blockchains are surg-
ing, increasingly more proposals are being made on extend-
ing blockchains to non-cryptocurrency areas such as smart
government, electronic healthcare systems, among many oth-
ers. Many systems and frameworks have been developed to
mimic and extend the functionality of Bitcoin since then.
Despite the popularity and practical applicability of
blockchains, there is very limited work on the theoretical
foundation of blockchains. While it is a good thing to see
blockchain-backed cryptocurrency brings in dynamics to our
society, both technically and financially, it is irresistible to un-
derstand the principle based on which blockchains achieves
such a success, if there is one such principle. The lack of rig-
orous theory and analysis behind the curtain of blockchains
has severely staggered its broader applications: at the end of
the day, we need to know not only whether and how it works,
but also why.
This paper presents our early attempts to lay out a the-
oretical foundation for a specific type of blockchains—the
ones requiring basic authenticity from the participants, also
called permissioned blockchain. We hope the analysis can
shed some insights into the principles of blockchains, not
only from a computer systems point of view but also human
factors. Admittedly, human factors are somewhat difficult to
account in, as many computer system concepts and solutions
are hardly applicable. We thus feel that bringing in the wis-
dom from utility theory and game theory would be inevitable
in order to achieve a deep understanding of blockchains—
distributed systems of intelligent agents. Therefore, we for-
mulate permissioned blockchain systems and operations into
a game-theoretical problem by incorporating constraints im-
plied by the wisdom from distributed computing and Byzan-
tine systems. More specifically, we show that:
• In a noncooperative blockchain game (NBG), a Nash
equilibrium can be efficiently found in a closed-form
even though the game involves more than two play-
ers. Somewhat surprisingly, the simulation results of the
Nash equilibrium implies that the game can reach a sta-
ble status regardless of the number of Byzantine nodes
and trustworthy players.
• We then study a harder problem where players are al-
lowed to form coalitions: the coalitional blockchain
game (CBG). We show that although the Shapley value
for a CBG can be expressed in a more succinct form, its
core is empty.
In the reminder of this paper, we will review important
concepts and related work in §2, articulate the models and
assumptions we make for the analysis in §3, define and ana-
lyze noncooperative and coalitional blockchains in §4 and §5,
respectively, and finally conclude the paper in §6,
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2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Blockchains
Although somewhat being mystified especially through the
hype of cryptocurrency like Bitcoin, the technical idea of
blockchain is surprisingly simple. From a data structure
standpoint, a blockchain is essentially a set of replicated
linkedlists of blocks: each block is verified by the descendent
block through a hash function. From a system perspective,
each copy of these linkedlists is usually deployed on a distinct
machine, being a physical computer or virtual machine; the
tricky part is, however, how to synchronize these linkedlists,
and that is exactly the root cause of many challenges, such as
consistency, performance, and security. Specifically, there are
a series of questions we need to answer: When should these
lists be synchronized? How can we verify the lists have been
synchronized? Where would these synchronizations happen?
just to name a few. Synchronization is one of the oldest
problems in many system perspectives, and thus recently re-
newed by the popularity of blockchains. Various communi-
ties showed a lot of interests in blockchains, notably in dis-
tributed systems [Herlihy, 2019], database systems [Ruan et
al., 2019], operating systems [Lind et al., 2019], and network
systems [Wang and Wang, 2019].
Synchronization also partly impacts the categorization
of blockchains. While the popular view of categorizing
blockchains is to whether open the blockchain to the pub-
lic, leading to the concept of permissionless blockchains
and permissioned blockchains, we want to point out that
an orthogonal, if not more understandable, criterion to clas-
sify a blockchain system lies on its underlying synchroniza-
tion mechanism. At one extreme, the synchronization can
be completely based on individualism, being represented
by Proof-of-Work (PoW) [Bitcoin, 2008], Proof-of-Stake
(PoS) [Ethereum, 2019], among many others. The com-
monality of these mechanisms is that a single entity in the
blockchain, somehow, declares its superiority over others in
a competing round, and the whole blockchain moves forward
under its leadership. At the other end of the spectrum, we
observe a more democratic implementation of synchroniza-
tion: every node in the blockchain network has a vote about
how to proceed to the next step. At the writing of this paper,
the de facto protocol for ensuring this collaborative synchro-
nization is practical Byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) [Castro
and Liskov, 1999] addressing the original problem [Lamport
et al., 1982].
2.2 Byzantine Distributed Systems
Although widely used in literature, the term distributed sys-
tem is seldom formally defined. Here we adopt the definition
from [Tanenbaum and Van Steen, 2013]: “A distributed sys-
tem is a collection of autonomous computing elements that
appears to its users as a single coherent system.” One of
the most challenging problems in distributed systems is fault
tolerance: how would the distributed system mask its inter-
nal failures such that the user cannot notice the failures and,
more importantly, the dispatched tasks are correctly and effi-
ciently completed? To answer this question, we need first to
define what a failure really refers to. While there are various
ways to differentiate types of failures, the most notable types
are crash failures and Byzantine failures: the former refers to
those failures that cause node crash, and the latter refers to ar-
bitrary failures including but not limited to malicious attacks
that allow the node to continue to operate with (intentionally)
wrong data and states. The name “Byzantine” originates from
warlords’ treacherous behaviors in the ancient Byzantine Em-
pire. In this paper, we use Byzantine Distributed Systems to
refer to those distributed systems which adopt strong consen-
sus protocols to tolerate Byzantine failures.
Byzantine distributed systems are considered one of the
hardest paradigms, as the behavior of those Byzantine nodes
is arbitrary and cannot be predicted or estimated. This is even
harder than the well-known fail-stop paradigm, which can be
effectively circumvented by Paxos [Lamport, 1998] and its
variants. It was not until 1999 when the first practical pro-
tocol [Castro and Liskov, 1999] for tolerating Byzantine fail-
ures was published. In [Castro and Liskov, 1999], the au-
thors demonstrated that it was not only possible but also fea-
sible to have non-faulty nodes more than twice as the number
of Byzantine nodes such that the overall system was consis-
tent following the proposed 3-phase protocol called practical
Byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT). Since then, many follow-
up improvements such as reducing the number of nonfaulty
nodes and reducing the number of phases have been pro-
posed; and yet, the original PBFT protocol is still considered
as a good balance between generality and simplicity, and thus
widely used in practice (e.g., Hyperledger Fabric [Androulaki
et al., 2018].
2.3 Game Theory
Game theory was established to mathematically model many
practical problems in the form of games. It was first applied
to macroeconomics to explain many individual behaviors and
then quickly extended to other disciplines such as politics, so-
cial science, biological science, and computer science. For
example, auction theory—a subarea in game theory—has
been widely used in radio spectrum allocation. One of the
key insights brought by game theory is the introduction to ra-
tionality: each participant, or more commonly called an agent
in the game theory literature, is intelligent, meaning that she
has her own interest, such as maximizing a utility. This is in
sheer contrast to distributed systems, which simply assumes
the nodes are machines.1
If we rethink blockchains, each node is, in fact, a mix of
a machine and an agent. Put it in another way, a blockchain
node can be Byzantine, or can be maximizing the user’s util-
ity, or both. There was a good survey work [Abraham et al.,
2011] on discussing the commonality and difference between
game theory and distributed computing. More recently, ap-
plying game-theoretical approaches [Tsabary and Eyal, 2018;
Eyal, 2015] to blockchain security also emerged. This paper,
to our knowledge, is the first systematic work on blockchains
from both the distributed computing and the game-theoretical
perspectives.
1Indeed, one can argue that a machine can also be intelligent.
3 Models and Assumptions
There are three type of nodes, or players, involved in a
blockchain system: a good citizen (C) who always votes for
the proposal, a terrorist (T) who always votes against the pro-
posal, and an adventurer (A) who makes her decision to max-
imize the utility (either voting for or against the proposed
value, i.e., A = Ag ∪ Ab). We use N = C ∪ T ∪ A to de-
note the entire set of nodes, and use n = |N | to indicate the
cardinality of the node set.
Terrorist. The term terrorist first appeared in the pioneer
work [Moscibroda et al., 2006], which, for the first time, syn-
thesized two orthogonal research communities of distributed
computing and game theory in the famous virus inoculation
game. Specifically, a terrorist is irrational in the sense that
he does not follow any protocol and is disinterested in ei-
ther the utility or the cost (for the attack). From a distributed
computing standpoint, a terrorist is definitely a faulty node
that will vote against the proposed (true) value. Convention-
ally, such nodes are called Byzantine nodes whose actions
are completely arbitrary, including coalition with other peers
against the proposed value. In blockchains, a terrorist could
be, for example, a malicious hacker intentionally forking a
long sidechain, a proxy node from another blockchain com-
petitor to slow down the performance, to name a few. We will
use t = |T| to denote the cardinality of the terrorist set T.
Good Citizen. In contrast to a terrorist, a good citizen
(or, a citizen for short in the following discussion) always
votes for the proposed value. From a distributed system’s
standpoint, a citizen represents a highly reliably node with
automatic backup and recovery, meaning that it follows the
consensus protocol for the eventual agreement across partici-
pating nodes. From a game theory’s point of view, however, a
citizen is not considered rational in the sense that she does not
attempt to maximize any utility and only follow the consen-
sus protocol—she is not self-interested. We will use c = |C|
to denote the cardinality of the citizen set C.
Adventurer. An adventurer is an opportunist: she will
maximize her utility by voting for or against the proposed
value. Nevertheless, her utility is dependent not only on her
own action but also others’—a normal-form game because:
• (Finite Players) All nodes in a blockchain are iden-
tifiable using their public keys;
• (Finite Actions) Each node has three available ac-
tions on the new proposed value: yes, no, and abstain.
Each of the actions leads to a numerical payoff.
Depending on the votes made by an adventurer, we further
denote the set of adventurers voting Yes as Ag and the set of
the other adventurers who vote No as Ab. In the following
discussion, we use g = |Ag| and b = |Ab| for the two subsets’
cardinalities, respectively.
4 Noncooperative Blockchain Game
4.1 Definition
Strategy Profiles
A distributed system including blockchains usually adopts a
timeout mechanism that set some unresponsive nodes to a de-
fault value, such as null or nil, as an “abstention” vote. From
a pure system point of view, an abstention vote is not dif-
ferent than a no vote—the system usually takes a very con-
servative position in interpreting the responses. In the case
of permissioned blockchains, therefore, the consensus proto-
col interprets an abstention vote as a no vote. Formally, we
have two pure strategies (or, actions) for all the n nodes in
the blockchain: {Yes, No}, 0 ≤ i < n. It should be noted
that a strategy in game theory can be mixed: although we
have only two pure strategies here, the set of statistical dis-
tributions, denoted by Si for the i-th player, over only two
values is still considerable and, arguably, more importantly,
serves as a cornerstone for the Nash equilibrium: the high-
dimensional simplex theory and fixed-point theorems are all
built upon the idea of convex combinations, which, implicitly,
assumes a “mix” of strategies.
If the system is not compromised, the non-faulty nodes will
continue to work on “agreeing” on the next proposed value
and get rewarded by a transaction fee, and the faulty nodes
might be forced to leave the network; Otherwise, the faulty
nodes overturn the existing network and collect a high reward,
leaving the “honest” nodes’ work worthless. Note that we
ignore the cost (e.g., electricity, hardware procurement, space
rental) for mining blocks or attacking the network. Formally,
the utility function ui for a player i is defined as follows:
un =
{ pn
g + c , if g + c > b+ t
0, otherwise
(1)
where pn denotes the overall payoff of a winning “honest”
nodes and n denotes that winning non-faulty node, i.e., n ∈
Ag ∪ C; and
uf =
{pf
b
, if g + c ≤ b+ t
0, otherwise
(2)
where pf denotes the overall payoff of all “deviating” nodes
and f denotes a faulty node, i.e., f ∈ Ab.
In practice, pf is orders of magnitude higher than pn, mo-
tivating those adversaries to take the risk. As a concrete ex-
ample, an honest node in a Bitcoin network is rewarded 12.5
BTCs, which, at the writing of this paper, are roughly worth
$93,000 USD2; however, if the network is compromised, the
net loss could be in the order of tens of millions of dollars.
For example, 72-million dollars were stolen in the notorious
mega-hack in 2016 [Bitcoin Mega-Hack, 2016].
Zero-Sum among Non-Byzantine Nodes
An important observation is that all the non-Byzantine nodes
constitute a zero-sum game. That is, the Byzantine nodes, or
terrorists, are disinterested in the expense or utility incurred
in the game—the only objective is to compromise the net-
work. As a consequence, we have the following zero-sum
constraint:
0 ≡ c · pn + g · pn − b · pf (3)
where the first term indicates the payoff for good citizen, the
second term indicates the payoff for adventurers who vote for
the proposal, the third term indicates the payoff for adventur-
ers who vote against the proposal.
2We do not count the transaction fee, usually about $0.1x USD
per transaction.
Figure 1: Noncooperative blockchain game.
Consensus Protocols
There are rich literature in handling arbitrary nodes in the
distributed system community. In the context of permis-
sioned blockchains (Hyperledger Fabric [Androulaki et al.,
2018] and other variants based on PBFT [Castro and Liskov,
1999]), the state-of-the-art takes a quorum-based mechanism
to move forward. In permissioned blockchains, the consensus
protocols require that non-faculty nodes outnumber the faulty
nodes by at least 200%: g+c > 2(b+t), or more commonly
known as n ≥ 3 · (b+ t) + 1. More formally, we set the dif-
ference as one between the two groups as the borderline case
in the following discussion:
c+ g ≥ 1 + 2 · (t+ b) (4)
Definition 4.1 (Noncoorperative blockchain game). A
noncooperative Byzantine game represented by a tuple
〈N,S, u, P 〉, whereN represents the players, S = S1×· · ·×
Sn denotes the mixed-strategy profiles, u indicates the utility
functions, and P denotes the consensus protocol among the
players, such that each adventurer node maximizes its utility
without violating P .
Essentially, the free players would choose between being
part of either Ag or Ab, exclusively, such that her utility is max-
imized under the constraints specified by Equation 1, Equa-
tion 2, Equation 3, and Equation 4.
We illustrate the whole game in Figure 1. We conjecture
that a noncooperative blockchain game (NBG) exists a Nash
equilibrium between Ag and Ab, in which no player from one
set has the incentive to change her mind to move to the other
set for higher payoff—the cardinalities of Ag and Ab reach
equilibrium under unilateral change of strategies. The next
section will test this hypothesis and, in fact, demonstrate that
there is indeed a Nash equilibrium in a closed-form. Other
solution concepts are also possible, and yet beyond the scope
of this paper.
4.2 Nash Equilibrium
Since the goal is to analyze the decisions made by Ag and Ab,
in the following discussion, we assume the other variables
are known. That is, we assume the values of c and t are well
estimated before the game starts. Also, we assume the payoff
values pn and pf can be accurately predicted as a priori.
If we consider the system of Equation 3 and Equation 4,
i.e., {
c · pn + g · pn − b · pf = 0
c+ g ≥ 1 + 2 · (t+ b) (5)
we will have
b = (g + c) · γ
where γ = pnpf . Note that in the real world, pf is orders of
magnitude larger than pn, implying that 0 < γ  1. We
call this variable reciprocal risk factor (RRF), indicating the
payoff ratio of a compliant action over a deviating action.
We can then rewrite the inequality in Eq. 5 into
g ≥ 1 + 2(t+ γ · (g + c))− c
= 1 + 2t+ (2γ − 1) · c+ 2γ · g
Consequently, we derive g in the following form:
g ≥ 1 + 2t
1− 2γ − c (6)
That is, to satisfy all the game constraints, the number of
good adventurers has to exceed a specific threshold jointly
determined by the number of good citizens, the number of
terrorists, and RRF.
Similarly, we can derive b in the following form:
b ≥ γ · (1 + 2t)
1− 2γ (7)
Interestingly, the number of bad adventurers is independent
of the number of citizens, even though there is a zero-sum
constraints involving both groups.
In practice, the overall payoff of the winning side, either
the faulty cohort or the non-faulty cohort, is fixed. Therefore,
both g and b would be preferably set to the minimums. As a
result, we have the following optimal setup:g
∗ = 1 + 2t1− 2γ − c
b∗ = γ · (1 + 2t)1− 2γ
(8)
That is, if there are g∗ good adventurers and b∗ bad adven-
turers in the game, then the all constraints are satisfied. We
then calculate the ratio of g∗ over g∗ + b∗:
Pr(g) =
1 + 2t− (1 + 2γ)c
1 + γ + 2(1 + 2γ)(2t− c) (9)
Let Pr(g) be the probability of an adventurer voting for Yes.
That is, the mixed strategy s∗ of an adventurer expressed in a
lottery is l = [Pr(g) : Yes, 1− Pr(g) : No].
Theorem 1. Given a noncoorperative blockchain game, a
mixed strategy with probability Pr(g) of voting Yes is a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. The scratch of our proof is as follows. It should be
noted that the summation of g and b is constant. Therefore,
an adventurer unilaterally changing her local strategy would
decrement its the cardinality of her original set (either Ag or
Ab) and simultaneously increment the other one by one. It
then boils down to two cases: (i) a “bad” adventurer changes
to a “good” one, or (ii) a “good” adventurer changes to a
“bad” one. We will investigate both cases in the following.
For the sake of brevity, we will refer to Eq. 8 instead of Eq. 9
in the proof.
The first case is trivial. An adventurer a in Ab would not
bother to change his decision to join Ag because the new pay-
off would be lower anyhow, i.e., pn < pf . That is, assuming
all of the other players in A\{a} do not change their votes, a
would not increase her utility unilaterally.
The second case, however, needs a bit more work because
in contrast to the first case, now an adventurer a′ has a good
reason to move from Ag to Ab in pursue of higher utility un-
der the condition that all other players do not change their
strategies and the system still functions as before under the
constraints including zero-sum and consensus protocols. We
assume now a′ does move from Ag to Ab from previous state
E; then the new numbers of “good” (gˆ) and “bad” (bˆ) adven-
turers, are gˆ = g
∗ − 1 = 2 · γ + t1− 2γ − c
bˆ = b∗ + 1 = 1 + γ · (2t− 1)1− 2γ
And we know that Eˆ = 〈gˆ, bˆ〉 will break the consensus pro-
tocol requirement specified in Eq. 4. In this case, from a dis-
tributed system point of view, there will be another player a′′
attempting to move fromAb toAg because otherwise a′′ will
receive zero payoff if the system reboots3 due to the Byzan-
tine failure; pn is still better than nothing. Therefore, g and b
will be reset to b∗ and b∗, respectively.
4.3 Simulation Results
We apply the model and equilibrium on a sample 10,000-
node blockchain. Note that the Bitcoin network currently
comprises about 10,000 miners worldwide [Bitcoin, 2008].
We set pn = 100,000 and pf = 70,000,000. Again, these
are practical numbers in the real world. [Bitcoin, 2008;
Bitcoin Mega-Hack, 2016].
Figure 2 reports the number of adventurers corresponding
to various portions of good citizens. Interestingly, the number
of adversarial adventurers stays at a stable level regardless of
the dramatic change of portions between citizens and terror-
ists. On the other hand, good-will adventurers will quickly
fill out the space left by the missing citizens. The implication
of this result is intriguing: as long as we can open the market
to a large pool of players (i.e., adventurers), the system will
reach equilibrium even if there are zero good citizens in the
game.
5 Coalitional Blockchain Game
5.1 Definition
This section sheers our focus from noncooperative normal-
form games into the more complex cooperative games, also
known as coalitional games, which essentially allows the
coalition form by subsets of players. In other words, there
will be a grand coalition formed by all the non-Byzantine
3So as other players inAb, although a′′ does not care.
players: Ag, Ab, and C. Essentially, when we assume individ-
ual players can collaborate in a coalitional game, the groups
formed by the individual players become the granularity in
the analysis. Consequently, when there is no confusion in the
context, the term player in a coalitional game really refers to
a group of individual players in the sense of noncooperative
games.
As all the coalitional games, we will strive to answer the
following two questions: (i) What is the Shapley value for
each player to feel the game is fair? (ii) Is the core empty?
If not, can we efficiently find one such that all players reach
equilibrium? Before answering both questions, we first define
the coalitional blockchain game (CBG) as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Coalitional blockchain game). A coalitional
blockchain game is a pair 〈N, v〉, where N is a set of three
players n = 3 and a characteristic function v : 2N 7→ R
associates with each subset of N with a payoff, denoted by
v(S) for all S ⊆ N :
v(S) =
{
p, if |S| > n2
0, otherwise
(10)
where p > 0 indicates the total payoff of the game.
5.2 Shapley Value
The Shapley value characterizes the fairness perceived by
each player: it quantifies the division of the grand-coalition
payoff. Formally, the general form of the Shapley value for
the i-th player calculated by
φi =
1
n!
·
∑
S⊆N\{i}
combinatorial coefficient︷ ︸︸ ︷
s! · (n− s− 1)! · (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal contribution
where s = |S|. A singleton coalitional blockchain game has
only three players; therefore, the factorials can be efficiently
calculated, which we will do soon. However, we want to point
it out that even for a “meta” version of coalition blockchain
games—a player (or, a group) is involved in multiple, in-
dependent blockchain games, the factorials can still be ac-
curately estimated by the Stirling approximation. The term
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) is also called marginal contribution and
therefore, the Shapley can be intuitively understood as the
combinatorial average of each player’s marginal contribu-
tion. In the following, we will dive deeper into this concept in
the context of coalitional blockchain games and derive a more
succinct and meaningful expression of the Shapley value.
According to Equation 10, the marginal contribution of
each player can be only p or 0: it degenerates to a binary vari-
able, or more commonly known as a dummy variable denoted
by Di(S) ∈ {1, 0}:
Di(S) =
{
1, if |S|+ 1 > n2 and |S| ≤ n2
0, otherwise
(11)
Therefore, the marginal contribution can be rewritten as p ·
Di(S).
In the defined coalitional blockchain game, we always have
n = 3. Therefore, we have 0 ≤ s ≤ 2, and 0 ≤ n−s−1 ≤ 2.
Figure 2: Simulation result on a 10,000-node blockchain.
We can construct the following (proposigional logic) formula:
E(S) = ¬(|S| mod 2) + 1 (12)
It is easy to verify the equivalence between E(S) and the
combinatorial coefficient in the general definition of Shap-
ley value. Therefore, the Shapley value of a coalitional
blockchain game is defined as:
φCBGi ,
p
6
·
∑
S⊆N\{i}
E(S) ·Di(S) (13)
5.3 Core
Unlike the Nash equilibrium that always exists in a noncoop-
erative game, the counterpart equilibrium, namely the core, in
a coalitional game, may not exist. Even worse, the problem of
deciding whether an arbitrary coalitional game has an empty
core is, in many cases, NP-complete. In the remainder of this
section, we will show that a coalitional blockchain game has
an empty core.
First, we reiterate important definitions in coalitional game
theory. A core in a coalitional game is a set of payoff vectors
in the grand coalition such that no smaller coalition collec-
tively can do better:
∀S ⊆ N,
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)
where xi is the payoff function for player i. To show the
emptiness of the core, we also need to define a class of coali-
tional game called additive coalitional game as follows.
Definition 5.2 (Additive coalitional game). A coalitional
game 〈N, v〉 is additive if for any two distinct subsets S ⊆ N ,
T ⊆ N , and S ∩U = ∅, such that v(S ∪U) = v(S) + v(U).
Lemma 2. A coalitional blockchain game is not additive.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove the lemma by identifying one
counterexample. Let g = 1 and c = n2 . We then have
v(Ag) = 0 and v(C) = 0. By definition, however, v(Ag∪C) =
p > 0 6= v(Ag) + v(C).
Theorem 3. A coalitional blockchain game has an empty
core.
Proof. First, we note that the coalitional blockchain game is
a constant-sum game, because the overall balance among the
three players does not change after the game. On the other
hand, according to Lemma 2, we cannot simply calculate the
overall payoff of a coalition of multiple players—that is, there
exists interference among players. As a result, the grand pay-
off would not be always larger than or equal to the balance-
weighted-payoffs from subsets of the grand coalition. Ac-
cording to the Bondereva-Shapley theorem, such a coalitional
game does not have a non-empty core. Alternatively, the
same conclusion can be drawn by applying the well-known
result that states that “a constant-sum coalitional game has
no nonempty core if the game is not additive.” [Shoham and
Leyton-Brown, 2008]
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper attempts to lay out a theoretical foundation for
a specific type of blockchains—the ones requiring basic au-
thenticity from the participants, also called permissioned
blockchain. We formulate permissioned blockchain systems
and operations into a game-theoretical problem by incorpo-
rating constraints implied by the wisdom from distributed
computing and Byzantine systems. We show that in a non-
cooperative blockchain game (NBG), a Nash equilibrium can
be efficiently found in a closed-form even though the game
involves more than two players. Somewhat surprisingly, the
simulation results of the Nash equilibrium implies that the
game can reach a stable status regardless of the number of
Byzantine nodes and trustworthy players. We then study a
harder problem where players are allowed to form coalitions:
the coalitional blockchain game (CBG). We show that al-
though the Shapley value for a CBG can be expressed in a
more succinct form, its core is empty. Our main future work
is to extend the game into an extensive form: the blockchain
will be modeled as a series of rounds.
References
[Abraham et al., 2011] Ittai Abraham, Lorenzo Alvisi, and
Joseph Y. Halpern. Distributed computing meets game the-
ory: Combining insights from two fields. SIGACT News,
2011.
[Androulaki et al., 2018] Elli Androulaki, Artem Barger,
Vita Bortnikov, Christian Cachin, Konstantinos Chris-
tidis, Angelo De Caro, David Enyeart, Christopher Ferris,
Gennady Laventman, Yacov Manevich, Srinivasan Mu-
ralidharan, Chet Murthy, Binh Nguyen, Manish Sethi,
Gari Singh, Keith Smith, Alessandro Sorniotti, Chrysoula
Stathakopoulou, Marko Vukolic´, Sharon Weed Cocco, and
Jason Yellick. Hyperledger fabric: A distributed operat-
ing system for permissioned blockchains. In Proceedings
of the Thirteenth EuroSys Conference, EuroSys ’18, pages
30:1–30:15, New York, NY, USA, 2018. ACM.
[Bitcoin Mega-Hack, 2016] Bitcoin Mega-Hack.
https://proeconomia.wordpress.com/2016/08/05/
weekly-globo-digest, 2016.
[Bitcoin, 2008] Bitcoin. https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf,
2008.
[Castro and Liskov, 1999] Miguel Castro and Barbara
Liskov. Practical byzantine fault tolerance. In Proceed-
ings of the Third Symposium on Operating Systems Design
and Implementation, OSDI ’99, pages 173–186, Berkeley,
CA, USA, 1999. USENIX Association.
[Ethereum, 2019] Ethereum. https://www.ethereum.org/,
2019.
[Eyal, 2015] Ittay Eyal. The miner’s dilemma. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P), pages 89–103,
2015.
[Herlihy, 2019] Maurice Herlihy. Blockchains from a
distributed computing perspective. Commun. ACM,
62(2):78–85, 2019.
[Lamport et al., 1982] Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak, and
Marshall Pease. The byzantine generals problem. ACM
Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., 4(3):382–401, July 1982.
[Lamport, 1998] Leslie Lamport. The part-time parliament.
ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., 16(2):133–169, May 1998.
[Lind et al., 2019] Joshua Lind, Oded Naor, Ittay Eyal,
Florian Kelbert, Emin Gün Sirer, and Peter Pietzuch.
Teechain: A secure payment network with asynchronous
blockchain access. In Proceedings of the 27th ACM Sym-
posium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP), page
63–79, 2019.
[Moscibroda et al., 2006] Thomas Moscibroda, Stefan
Schmid, and Rogert Wattenhofer. When selfish meets
evil: Byzantine players in a virus inoculation game. In
Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Annual ACM Symposium
on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC ’06, pages
35–44, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[Ruan et al., 2019] Pingcheng Ruan, Gang Chen, Anh
Dinh, Qian Lin, Beng Chin Ooi, and Meihui Zhang.
Fine-grained, secure and efficient data provenance for
blockchain. PVLDB, 12(9):975–988, 2019.
[Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008] Yoav Shoham and
Kevin Leyton-Brown. Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic,
Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. Cambridge
University Press, USA, 2008.
[Tanenbaum and Van Steen, 2013] Andrew S. Tanenbaum
and Maarten Van Steen. Distributed Systems. Pearson Ed-
ucation, 2013.
[Tsabary and Eyal, 2018] Itay Tsabary and Ittay Eyal. The
gap game. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(CCS), page 713–728, 2018.
[Wang and Wang, 2019] Jiaping Wang and Hao Wang.
Monoxide: Scale out blockchain with asynchronized con-
sensus zones. In 16th USENIX Symposium on Networked
Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI), 2019.
